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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of college merger on the probabil-
ity of students dropping out of college. In addition we assess whether
this effect persists over time and whether there is variation in the risk
of drop out by programme area. To answer these questions we use a
large administrative data set relating to the population of students en-
rolled in the further education sector for multiple cohorts of students
(i.e. 2002-03 to 2007-08 cohorts). We employ the propensity score
matching methods and difference-in-differences methods to overcome
the fundamental evaluation problem and to remove the effect of un-
observed student (and college) heterogeneity. Our evidence suggests
that the risk of drop out has varied over time (by cohort), reducing
the risk by about 1-2 percentage points for earlier cohorts, which con-
trasts with positive effects for later cohorts, which were as high as 5
percentage points. We also show that the effects of merger persisted
for 1-2 years and that there was variation in the effect of a merger by
programme area. Our results raise important implications for policy
makers insofar as mergers cannot be unanimously assumed to be ei-
ther negative or positive. The effect probably varies with the nature
of the merger (voluntary versus involuntary) and by programme area
regardless of the type of merger.
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1 Introduction
Dropping out of college implies a high cost for both individual students and for
society as a whole. Young people risk entering unemployment and economic
inactivity (so-called NEET - Not in Education, Employment or Training) if
they terminate college before they have achieved a qualification. This may
have serious long-term consequences on their future labour market outcomes,
such as reduced earnings and further spells of NEET. Since the publication of
the Foster Report in 2005 there has been a clear commitment by the British
Government to create incentives for Further Education colleges to focus on the
achievement and progression of their students, and hence to reducing drop out
rates.1 The Foster Report created strong incentives for colleges to merge to
enable them to exploit both economies of scale and of scope (Foster, 2005) and
there is some evidence that merger activity did increase after the publication
of the report.
The management sciences literature has investigated the effects of college
mergers on college finances, efficiency or organisation (Goedegebuure, 1992;
Lang, 2002), however, the effect of mergers on student outcomes, such as drop
out rates, has been neglected. Payne (2008) and Lang (2002) show that there
are two main reasons for colleges to merge. On the one hand, there are the
economic and financial reasons related to the concept of productive efficiency.
This rationale is mainly related to the opportunity for merged institutions to
exploit economies of scale both in teaching and service provision. However,
as noted by Lang (2002), mergers can also be motivated by government fi-
nancial incentives. Another reason for merger is that they can create greater
opportunities for the diversification of courses and for the provision of a wider
range of services to students. This can be true for both small and large in-
stitutions involved and may have the effect of reducing drop out rates and
increasing student attainment. There are, however, potential downsides to
merger, such as the disruptive effect it may have on student life. This could
be due to initial organisational difficulties, or because mergers increase col-
lege size and therefore increase the ‘distance’ between students and college
management. Consequently, individual students in merged colleges may feel
more alienated, which reduces attainment and increases the risk of drop out.
Clearly, whether college mergers have a positive or a negative effect on stu-
dent drop out behaviour is an empirical question. This paper therefore seeks
to investigate the effect of college mergers, which have the effect of increas-
1Further Education colleges comprise that sector of the education system in the UK
which sits between compulsory schooling and Higher Education. Students in the sector are
typically aged between 16-19 and colleges may be General, Specialist (e.g. Drama, Art and
Design, Agricultural) or Sixth Form colleges. The latter tend to focus on academic courses
of study whereas the other types of college also offer vocational courses.
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ing the size of the merged institution, on the probability of drop out. We
stop short of claiming a causal relationship between college mergers and stu-
dent dropout behaviour, because we are unable to control fully for the biases
that arise from the selection of colleges into the treatment group, although
our difference-in-differences methodology does go some way to mitigate this
bias. It is, nevertheless, important from a policy perspective to understand
the interdependencies between mergers and student behaviour.
It is also possible that there is heterogeneity in the effect of mergers on stu-
dent dropout behaviour insofar as different programme areas within a college
are more, or less, able to realise the benefits of economies of scale and scope.
Mergers could have positive effects in programme areas requiring laborato-
ries, since the merger may potentially lead to sharing of more facilities, and
contrasting negative effects where the discipline requires a low pupil-teacher
ratio (e.g. the humanities). A second objective of this paper is to investigate
heterogeneity in the impact of mergers between programme, or subject, areas.
The effects of mergers could also vary over time. Dropout rates could
increase immediately following a merger, due to initial organisational difficul-
ties, but they may decline once these initial problems have been resolved. A
third objective of this paper is therefore to investigate both the short and
medium term effects of college mergers on drop out rates.
To address these issues we use administrative data provided by the Learn-
ing Skills Council (LSC). These data cover the population of students enrolled
in colleges of Further Education in England. Specifically, we use the Individu-
alised Learner Record data set, and for our purposes we use six cross-sections
of student data referring to the years from 2002-03 to 2007-08. Our econo-
metric methodology combines propensity score matching methods, making
use of the nearest neighbour algorithm, with a difference-in-differences ap-
proach. This approach allows us to find a suitable control group with whom
to compare the treated group - students in merged colleges - and we are
able to difference out unobserved fixed pupil and college characteristics in the
difference-in-differences approach. Clearly, this may not be sufficient to fully
remove the bias which might arise from the fact that merged colleges are not
a random subset of all colleges.
Our estimates suggest that for earlier cohorts, enrolling in a merged Fur-
ther Education college implies a decrease in the probability of dropping out
of 1-2 percentage points and these effects tended to persist for at least 1 or 2
years. However, for later years we find that enrolling in merged colleges in-
creases the probability of dropping out, and these effects were quite large and
persistent over time. This is consistent with the possibility that mergers fol-
lowing the publication of the Foster report were largely involuntary. Hence the
student experience may have been negatively affected, which led to a higher
drop out rate. Finally, there is also clear evidence of heterogeneous effects
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by programme area insofar as mergers benefit most students in scientific and
technical areas.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section
we briefly describe several models of dropout behaviour, which act as a frame-
work for interpreting our results, and also reviews the extensive literature on
the determinants of dropout behaviour. This is followed in Section 3 by a
discussion of our data and describe the ways in which we trim the sample
so that we obtain comparable treatment and control groups. Section 4 dis-
cusses our econometric methodology, which combines matching methods with
a difference-in-differences approach. The results of our analysis of the impact
of mergers then follow, focussing initially on the cross-sectional matching es-
timates, which give a baseline view of the impact of mergers on student drop
out behaviour, followed by the discussion of the difference-in-differences esti-
mates for colleges and programme areas. We end with our conclusions and
implications for policy.
2 Models and Previous Literature
The literature on student dropout behaviour is extensive and is mainly based
on US studies of high school and university students. There is very little work
on the determinants of dropout behaviour in the UK further education sector
(an exception is Bradley and Lenton (2007)).
The traditional theoretical model of drop out behaviour is the human cap-
ital model, however, interesting extensions to this model have recently been
developed which introduce behavioural factors into the analysis of the decision
making process. For instance, Oreopoulos (2007) presents an inter-temporal
model of dropout behaviour which incorporates the possibility of disutility
of attending school and non-monetary utility derived from education. In this
model a student drops out if the sum of the earnings forgone and the disutility
of education (i.e. the non-pecuniary psychological costs) exceeds the differ-
ence in expected income arising from continued study versus expected income
if they drop out. Uncertainty about future earnings is also introduced into the
model, which has the effect of making continued study even less appealing.
A drawback of the model is that it is essentially static insofar as students do
not update their expectations as a result of continued learning.
An alternative model, which builds on that by Oreopoulos (2007), is that
proposed by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2012) where dropout behaviour
arises from a learning process. In their model, students amend their expecta-
tions of expected lifetime utility of an extra year of education by taking into
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account the earnings of people with a college education versus those without.
The model incorporates uncertainty because the student is unsure about how
much human capital will be accumulated in an extra year of study, which
makes it difficult for the student to judge their own ability. The dropout
decision can then be seen as an optimal decision from the individuals point
of view, since students evaluate their match with their course of study and
update their expectations regarding net expected lifetime utility; if this is
negative then they drop out.
There are numerous studies of the determinants of dropout behaviour
which can be broadly divided in various categories depending on their focus
on the effects of personal, family, college and peer characteristics and labour
market conditions. Many of these studies are descriptive rather than causal
in nature.
In terms of personal characteristics, females and younger students are less
likely to drop out (Johnes and McNabb, 2004; Evans and Schwab, 1995; Smith
and Naylor, 2001; Chuang, 1997; Fielding et al., 1998). Lofstrom (2007) also
shows that about half of the gap in the dropout probability between white
and hispanics and one third of the gap between whites and blacks can be
explained by economic disadvantage. However, controlling for family back-
ground, Cameron and Heckman (2001) show that students from ethnic mi-
norities are more likely to graduate than whites. Bradley and Lenton (2007)
show that the probability of dropping out for all ethnic minorities is lower
than for white students when ability and a set of family and socio-economic
factors are taken into account. Ability, or more specifically prior attainment,
has been identified in the literature as one of the main determinants of dropout
behaviour. Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) find that higher ability students are
less likely to dropout. Heckman et al. (2006) suggest that the most recent
work on the topic, including their own analyses, show that both cognitive and
non-cognitive ability play an important role in determining the probability of
dropping out from High School. However, they also show that non-cognitive
ability has a much bigger effect on dropping out than cognitive ability.
The debate about the effect of family characteristics and socio-economic
indicators has been extensive. Its main starting point is the recognition that
income could be endogenous to the schooling and drop out decisions due to the
existence of unobserved family characteristics which could contemporaneously
affect income and dropout behaviour. However, a recent paper by Bratti
(2007) on the relationship between parental income and their childs dropout
behaviour shows that there are large effects of parental variables other than
income, such as social class and education. In contrast, Behrman et al. (2005)
and Bingley et al. (2008) find no effect of parental education on drop out
behaviour when using twins data in an attempt to deal with the endogeneity
issue.
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In terms of labour market effects, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) examine
whether working while in High School influences attainment and dropout,
concluding that it actually reduces student performance. Higher rates of youth
unemployment may increase the likelihood of dropping out, however, there are
contrasting findings in the literature - some find no effect (Warren and Lee,
2003; Mocetti, 2008), others a negative relationship (Rees and Mocan, 1997;
Peraita, 2000) and others a positive relationship (Smith and Naylor, 2001;
Bickel and Papagiannis, 1988). What we can conclude from this literature is
that the relationship between unemployment and dropout is a complex one.
One factor which is often associated with student outcomes is the existence
of peer effects. Evans et al. (1992) investigates whether peer effects play a role
in predicting student dropout behaviour. They find that peer effects affect
the decision to drop out of school, however, if the endogeneity of peer group
formation with respect to dropout decision is taken into account these effects
disappear.
The effect of college and institutional characteristics on student dropout
behaviour have been investigated less frequently. Bryk and Thum (1989) and
Rumberger and Palardy (2005) find that social and academic climate-related
factors are significantly related to dropout behaviour. McNeal (1997) and
Rumberger (1995) find that there is no effect of academic climate on dropout
behaviour. McNeal (1997) and Rumberger and Palardy (2005) find that the
student/teacher ratio is a positive and significant determinant of dropout be-
haviour even when student background characteristics and other factors are
taken in consideration. Finally, there is no consensus in the literature about
the effect of school size on dropout behaviour. Bryk and Thum (1989) find
that school size has no direct effect on these two measures of student out-
comes. Similar evidence is found for the UK HE sector (Smith and Naylor
(2001)), however some early work by Rumberger (1995) finds a significant pos-
itive relationship between school size and dropout behaviour. More recently,
Rumberger and Thomas (2000) using the same data also find a positive signif-
icant relationship between size and dropout even after controlling for school
resources, attendance level and characteristics of the student body.
Thus, there is a long tradition of research into the determinants of student
dropout behaviour, however, the evidence is mixed and, as far as we are aware,
there has been no study of the effects of college merger on drop out behaviour.
3 The Data
We use a large administrative student dataset provided by the Learning Skills
Council, and specifically the Individual Learner Record (ILR). These cross-
section data provide detailed information about the population of students
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enrolled in Further Education colleges in England between the years 2002 to
2009. We imposed various restrictions on the data insofar as our sample refers
only to full-time, full year, non-working students because students enrolled in
part-time or in a short courses are likely to behave differently with respect to
their decision to drop out or not (Montmarquette et al., 2007; Warren and Lee,
2003). Similarly, our sample of students refers to those aged 16-24, since drop
out rates have been shown to be much higher for adult students. Students
enrolled on Basic Skills only programmes, involving literacy and numeracy
revision, are excluded for similar reasons. Lastly, we exclude students who
transferred to other courses - these constitute a small proportion of the stu-
dent population (i.e. less than 0.2%) - since we do not know the courses they
transferred to. These restrictions on the sample will ensure that our treat-
ment and control groups are more comparable. More generally, as Mueser
et al. (2007) notes, the use of administrative data to obtain propensity score
matching estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated can be a
very effective.
Given the focus of our paper, Table 1 shows the number of mergers between
(mainly two) colleges over the period of our study, 2002-2009. The number
of mergers has been small, as one might expect, reaching a peak in 2007-
08 at 14 mergers which affected nearly 5% of the total Further Education
student population. When looked at on a cumulative basis, however, the
number of mergers over the period is 77, including 32 that occured between
1998-2001.2 Viewed on a cumulative basis, college mergers impacted almost
160,000 students which is substantial.
Tables 2 and 3 shows the size of our final samples for all the cross-sections
as well as the proportions of students that dropped out by merged and non-
merged colleges. We can see from the Table 2 that the number of students
enrolled in Further Education colleges has steadily increased over time, re-
flecting the rising staying-on rate, suggesting that more ’marginal’ students
may well be entering college towards the end of the study period. What this
Table also shows is that the dropout rate is quite large but is almost always
higher in merged colleges than in non-merged colleges. Moreover, the dropout
rate tends to increase towards the end of the study period; in fact, for the
2006-07 cohort the dropout rate in merged colleges reaches a peak at 15.5%,
compared to around 10.5% for non-merged colleges. Table 3 differs to Table
2 insofar as it indicates whether the student was enrolled in a college which
had gone through a merger at any point in time between 1997 and 2008. By
analysing the effect of mergers from 1997 up to say, 2002, we are able to in-
vestigate the medium term effects of merger, whereas looking at the in-year
mergers 2002-03 (Table 2) we are only able to assess the short term effects of
2Since we do not have student data for this time period we do not refer to them in
Table 1, however, we do investigate the impact of these mergers on later student cohorts.
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mergers. Similar trends in dropout rates are apparent from Table 3. Finally,
Table 4 shows how the risk of dropping out varies by personal characteristics
and in the foot of the Table by the number of colleges in the local Learning
Skills Council (LLSC) area.
Table 5 goes a step further in exploring the variation in drop out rates by
merged and non-merged colleges and shows the raw difference-in-differences
estimates. This Table tells a very different story with respect to the effect of
mergers on student drop out behaviour. For the early cohorts (up to the 2005
cohort), mergers reduce drop out rates by between 0.5-4 percentage points
and these effects persist insofar as the lagged responses continue to be neg-
ative. For instance, the first block of estimates which refer to mergers in
2004 shows that the raw difference-in-differences estimate of the drop out rate
for the treated group is 1 percentage point lower than for the control group,
whereas two years later this has risen to -1.7 percentage points. Especially
from 2006 onwards, however, the raw difference-in-differences estimates are
positive, large and statistically significant. This implies that the mergers aris-
ing in this period may well have been qualitatively different when compared
to those that occurred in the earlier period. One possible reason for this is
that the Government report produced by Foster in 2005 did encourage merg-
ers in the sector as a means of increasing efficiency and effectiveness amongst
colleges, and there is evidence of increased merger activity in that year (see
Table 1). These may have therefore been involuntary mergers with consequen-
tial negative effects on drop out rates. We explore whether there has been a
shift in merger behaviour and student drop out rates in more depth in our
econometric modelling.
4 Econometric Methodology
Estimating the effect of college merger on a student probability of dropping out
implies that we are able to analyse the counterfactual situation in which those
same students attended a non-merged college. Since it is impossible for the
same student to be observed in both the treated and control group at the same
time, it is necessary to develop methods for solving the so-called ‘fundamental
evaluation problem’. Furthermore, it is possible in our context that selection
bias may influence our estimates. This can arise insofar as students attending
a merged college differ in systematic ways from their counterparts in non-
merged colleges even in the absence of treatment.
We therefore use propensity score matching coupled with difference-in-
differences analysis to try to overcome the evaluation problem and mitigate
selection bias. The parameter that we estimate in our analysis is the average
treatment effect on the treated, ‘ATT’, which is defined as
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τATT = E(τ |D = 1) = E(Y (1)|D = 1)− E(Y (0)|D = 1) (1)
Therefore the ATT is equal to the difference between the expected outcome
of treated students who have actually been treated and the expected outcome
of treated students who had not been treated. The task here is to define a
mechanism that describes the process of assignment into treatment. Matching
methods involve the selection of a group of non-treated students similar to the
treated in all the relevant pre-treatment characteristics (X ). Therefore, the
difference in outcomes between those students and the treated ones will be
attributable to the treatment. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) we
use a balancing score to ensure that at each of the values the distribution of
X for the treated and untreated students is the same. The propensity score
(PS) is one of the possible balancing scores and corresponds to the conditional
probability of receiving the treatment, given the pre-treatment variables.
A key assumption of the matching approach is the conditional indepen-
dence assumption which suggests that matching is based on observable char-
acteristics. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) also shows that the conditional
independence assumption remains valid if, after controlling for p(X ), instead
of X, the treatment and potential outcomes are independent such that:
Y (1), Y (0)⊥D|p(X) (2)
As noted by Imbens (2004), if condition 2 holds, conditioning on the
propensity score removes all biases due to observable characteristics, X. This
is equivalent to stating that all existing selection bias is assumed to be deter-
mined by the observable characteristics. It is not possible to test this condition
directly therefore one can only conduct a sensitivity analysis for the existence
of unobserved heterogeneity or hidden bias. Alternatively, one can combine
matching methods with a difference-in-differences methodology which is our
preferred approach.
A second key assumption of the matching approach is the overlap or com-
mon support condition:
0 < P (D = 1|X) < 1 (3)
The basic intuition behind this assumption is that there has to be at least
one similar student in the counterfactual state for each treated student. In
other words, for every single value of X the probability of finding a treated
and a control student must be greater than 0 (Heckman et al., 1999).
Given assumptions 2 and 3, the matching estimator for the ATT is:
τATT = Ep(X)|D=1{E[Y (1)|D = 1, p(X)]− E[Y (0)|D = 0, p(X)]}
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Thus, computing the ATT entails taking the mean outcome of treated and
control students, comparing them for each given value of p(X ) in the common
support and finally weighting them for the propensity score distribution.
All matching estimators can be seen as a special case of the following where








T and C indicate, respectively, the treatment and control students, Wij
denotes the weights assigned to the control group when matching with the
treated group, and wi represent a re-weighting needed to re-build the outcome
distribution for the treated.
4.1 Matching with Difference-in-Differences Estimation
As suggested above, the estimation of an average treatment effect on the
treated using propensity score matching relies heavily on the validity of the
conditional independence assumption. Therefore, it only estimates a causal
effect in the absence of selection on unobservables. Rather than simply test for
the presence of hidden bias, a more robust method for removing such bias is
to combine propensity score matching with difference-in-differences methods.
The difference-in-differences approach does allow for unobservables to affect
treatment participation as long as this bias is constant over time (Heckman
et al., 1998; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009).
To perform matching with difference-in-differences we need at least one
pre- and one post-treatment period. Moreover, we need to identify four dif-
ferent groups of students - one of which refer to the treated students and the
remaining three groups are made up of students in control groups. Recall
that treatment in this context refers to the event of college merger. Thus,
we observe T0 and C0 which represent the treated and control groups in the
pre-treatment period, whilst T1 and C1 are the treated and control group in
the post-treatment period. As pointed out by Blundell and Costa Dias (2009)
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when matching with the treated student i. W˜ Tijt refers to the same weight for
students in group T . Finally, wi represents a re-weighting needed to re-build




In this section of the paper we present our cross-sectional matching estimates
of the effect of college merger on student drop out behaviour for the period
2002-08. These estimates are useful insofar as they provide a baseline view
of the effect of college merger, however, it is important to note that these
estimates do not control for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, for
each cohort we estimate the propensity of a student to enrol in a merged college
conditional on a set of pre-treatment characteristics using a probit model. The
pre-treatment characteristics we have chosen to include in our propensity score
specification are gender, age (mature students), ethnicity, disability, prior
attainment and the number of colleges in the Local Learning Skills Council.
Following the suggestion of Rubin and Thomas (1996) and Heckman et al.
(1998), these covariates were chosen on the basis of the existence of a well
known relationship with the outcome of interest, but also because they are
likely to be important predictors of treatment. As Table A.1 in Appendix A
shows all of these variables are statistically significant, and the estimates are
largely consistent over time.
The estimates in Table 6 are split into three panels - Panel A which can
be seen as in-year effects of mergers on the probability of drop out, Panel
B reports short run lagged effects and finally, Panel C reports medium term
lagged effects to capture the persistence of mergers on drop-out behaviour.
Unlike the descriptive statistics presented earlier, the matching estimates for
the in-year effects of merger (Panel A) are far more consistent and show that
merger increases the probability of drop out by around 1 percentage point,
the exception being cohort 2006-07 where the estimates rise substantially to
4.5 percentage points post-matching. As Panel B shows these effects do not
tend to persist for earlier cohorts, whereas for later cohorts (2005 onwards)
there is some evidence that college merger can increase drop out rates for fu-
ture cohorts (1-3 years after the merger event). Towards the end of the study
period these effects become quite large - 3-6 percentage points - and so the
cross-sectional matching evidence is consistent with the raw data, discussed
above. Panel C provides further evidence that mergers can have lasting ad-
verse effects on drop out rates - increasing the probability of drop out by
around 1 percentage point.
We also explored gender differences in the effect of merger on the prob-
ability of drop out. Although there are occasional differences in the risk of
drop out, the results for males and females are similar and follow the pattern
reported for the aggregated estimates discussed in the previous paragraph.
We therefore do not disaggregate by gender in the analysis that follows.
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Finally, in this section we briefly discuss the common support condition
and the issue of hidden bias. One of the two key assumptions for the validity
of propensity score matching estimation is the overlap or common support
condition. This assumption implies that treated and control students should
have a positive probability of enrolling in a merged college, as reflected by
their propensity score. Table A.2 reports evidence using the min-max method
whereby we discard from our analysis the treated observations that lie outside
of the region of common support. This method entails finding the minima and
maxima of the propensity score distribution for both treated and untreated
students and then defining a region by selecting the highest of the two minima
(maxmin) and the lowest of the two maxima (minmax). It is clear from
Table A.2 that the region of common support in three of the six cross-sections
corresponds perfectly. In the remaining three cross-sections we still have a
very good overlap. As a consequence, we can conclude that our estimated
effects can be considered very representative.
When implementing propensity score matching it is also importance to
check for the quality of the matching. In practical terms, this means checking
for covariate balance in the matched sample. Obtaining good covariate bal-
ance implies that the marginal distribution of each covariate is very similar for
treated and untreated individuals. The most widely used method for check-
ing the covariates balance is the so called standardised bias, or standardised
difference in means. This method proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)
entails comparing the standardised difference in means for each of the covari-
ates, between treated and untreated students before and after matching. A
reduction in the standardised bias after matching demonstrates that covari-
ate balance is improved by the matching procedures. Figure 1 in Appendix
A shows that we achieve levels of the standardised bias which are well under
the threshold considered as acceptable by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).
In the following section we seek to reduce the bias in our estimates caused
by the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, and hence we estimate matching
models in conjunction with difference-in-differences models.
5.2 Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of
college merger
The estimates from this analysis follow a similar pattern to those for the cross-
sectional matching models insofar as the signs of the estimates are consistent,
however, the estimated effects are now larger in magnitude.3 In-year effects
for the early cohorts suggest that mergers reduce the risk of drop out by
around 1-2 percentage points, however, the short run lagged effects, which
3Note that we cannot estimate models for college mergers occurring 1997-2001 because
we do not have data for this time period.
12
imply some persistence in the effect of merger, are larger in magnitude and
imply a decrease in the risk of drop out by between 2-4 percentage points. For
instance, mergers that occurred in 2004 have larger effects on the risk of drop
out in 2005, reducing this by about 4 percentage points, and 2006, reducing
this by 2.4 percentage points. This suggests that these mergers quickly re-
organised and the ’student experience’ was protected, hence the reduction in
the risk of drop out. However, mergers in later years (i.e. from around 2006
onwards) suggest that the probability of drop-out as a result of merger were
positive and large for in year effects and persisted for at least 1 or 2 years.
The exception to the findings above is for the 2006-07 cohort where the
risk of drop out for in-year effects is increased by 5.2 percentage points and
the short run (1 year) lagged effect is increased to 6.8 percentage points. As
suggested in the previous section, this may have been because mergers in
the later time period were different to those in the earlier period. To test
whether there has been a structural break in the effect of merger on student
drop-out behaviour we estimate a difference-in-differences model where we
combine data for the early time period (2002-2003) with the later time period
(2005-2007). Table 8 reports the results of this analysis and, interestingly,
suggest that between these two time periods college mergers had the effect
of increasing the risk of student drop out by about 1 percentage point. This
implies that mergers post the Foster Report were different to those prior to
the publication of the report, and it is likely that this finding is influenced
substantially by the estimates for the 2006-07 cohort. It could therefore also
be the case that 2006-07 cohort is somehow different to other cohorts pre- and
post-Foster Report implementation.
5.3 The effect of college mergers on drop out rates by
programme area
In this section we estimate models for students enrolled in one of six different
programme areas: Science, Humanities, Technical (agriculture, construction
and engineering), Business, Services to People and Basic Skills. We estimate
Equation 5 for each programme area but data limitations mean that we can
only do this for 2004 and 2005, the earlier time period. Table 9 provides the
results of this analysis and there are clear differences by programme area and
by year. For 2004 we observe for all programmes a reduction in the probability
of drop out, ranging from around 10 percentage points for technical and busi-
ness programmes, falling to 2 percentage points for other subjects. However,
for mergers taking place in 2005 there is greater diversity in the effect on drop
out behaviour, ranging from a reduction in Science by 4 percentage points
to an increase of 6 percentage points for Business programmes. It is unclear
why this variation over time should occur, however, it would appear to be
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the case that college mergers have greater benefits for students in technical
and scientific subjects, insofar as the risk of drop out tends to fall, perhaps
because they are better able to exploit economies of scale and scope.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the effect of college mergers on the risk of student
drop out using administrative data obtained from the former Learning Skills
Councils for the period 2002-2008. Our data refer to the population of stu-
dents enrolled in further education colleges and sixth forms in England. This
is the first study of the effect of college mergers on dropout behaviour. We
address several questions or issues. First, what is the effect of college merger
on student drop out behaviour? Second, is there any evidence that the effect
of merger persists into the future? And, finally, is there evidence of variation
in the effect of merger by programme area? To address these issues we com-
bine matching methods with the estimation of difference-in-differences models.
We find that there is evidence that mergers affecting earlier cohorts of
students reduced the risk of drop out and these effects tended to persist for at
least 1 or 2 years. However, in later years when the government was encour-
aging more colleges to merge for reasons of cost efficiency and effectiveness,
we actually find that the risk of drop out increased and the effect was quite
large. This implies that mergers in the latter time period my have been invol-
untary and hence had adverse effects on the students experience, leading to a
higher drop out rate. Again these effects persisted. There is also clear varia-
tion in the effect of mergers by programme area with technical and scientific
programmes benefiting most insofar as drop out rates typically fall.
Our findings are important from a policy persepctive because the FE sec-
tor is currently facing budget cuts which is creating consiferable uncertainty in
the sector. There are several ways that the sector could respond, for instance
by trying to enter new areas of activity or by seeking to recruit fee paying in-
ternational students or to engage in forms of transnational education. Clearly,
the raising of the school leaving age from 16 to 17 in England will add further
pressure on FE and sixth form colleges. For those colleges that struggle in
this turbulent environment there appear to be two other possible outcomes -
one is to simply cease operations as some colleges have done over time, and
the other option is to merge to share resources. If this were to happen on
a substantial scale then it is likely that student drop out rates will increase
further. Policy makers should therefore take notice of our findings. Equally,
those colleges that do engage in a merger, voluntarily or otherwise, need to
14
carefully consider how to protect the student expereince. Ignoring students
would in our view be very counter-productive.
15










2002/2003 4 1.81 36 43,868
2003/2004 5 2.09 41 61,141
2004/2005 7 2.14 48 77,572
2005/2006 6 1.15 54 88,287
2006/2007 4 1.77 58 106,726
2007/2008 14 4.64 72 134,016
2008/2009 5 1,89 77 159,742
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Table 2: Dropout rates by Merged and Non-merged colleges, 2002-09.
College Status
Non merged Merged All
Year 2002/2003 Completers 383,542 6,908 390,450
(90.30) (88.11) (90.26)
Dropouts 41,211 932 42,143
(9.70) (11.89) (9.74)
Total 424,753 7,840 432,593
Year 2003/2004 Completers 423,687 8,985 432,672
(90.71) (90.11) (90.69)
Dropouts 43,407 986 44,393
(9.29) (9.89) (9.31)
Total 467,094 9,971 477,065
Year 2004/2005 Completers 435,931 9,424 445,355
(91.17) (89.95) (91.14)
Dropouts 42,242 1,053 43,295
(8.83) (10.05) (8.86)
Total 478,173 10,477 488,650
Year 2005/2006 Completers 499,500 5,780 505,280
(91.68) (91.33) (91.68)
Dropouts 45,311 549 45,860
(8.32) (8.67) (8.32)
Total 544,811 6,329 551,140
Year 2006/2007 Completers 541,228 9,204 550,432
(89.42) (84.47) (89.33)
Dropouts 64,047 1,692 65,739
(10.58) (15.53) (10.67)
Total 605,275 10,896 616,171
Year 2007/2008 Completers 544,498 26,679 571,177
(89.89) (90.62) (89.93)
Dropouts 61,212 2,761 63,973
(10.11) (9.38) (10.07)
Total 605,710 29,440 635,150
Year 2008/2009 Completers 595,592 11,071 606,663
(90.58) (87.39) (90.52)
Dropouts 61,906 1,598 63,504
(9.42) (12.61) (9.48)
Total 657,498 12,669 670,167
a) Column percentage in brackets.
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Table 3: Dropout rates by Merged and Non-merged colleges, 2002-2009. Cu-
mulative mergers.
College Status
Non merged Merged All
Year 2002/2003 Completers 334,710 41,454 376,164
(90.46) (88.85) (90.28)
Dropouts 35,310 5,200 40,510
(9.54) (11.15) (9.72)
Total 370,020 46,654 416,674
Year 2003/2004 Completers 367,151 53,105 420,256
(90.89) (89.49) (90.71)
Dropouts 36,815 6,237 43,052
(9.11) (10.51) (9.29)
Total 403,966 (59,342 463,308
Year 2004/2005 Completers 379,275 66,080 445,355
(91.48) (89.26) (91.14)
Dropouts 35,346 7,949 43,295
(8.52) (10.74) (8.86)
Total 414,621 74,029 488,650
Year 2005/2006 Completers 402,459 78,241 480,700
(91.99) (90.13) (91.68)
Dropouts 35,044 8,572 43,616
(8.01) (9.87) (8.32)
Total 437,503 86,813 524,316
Year 2006/2007 Completers 426,285 93,879 520,164
(89.64) (87.73) (89.29)
Dropouts 49,250 13,130 62,380
(10.36) (12.27) (10.71)
Total 475,535 107,009 582,544
Year 2007/2008 Completers 424,992 116,018 541,010
(90.37) (88.63) (89.99)
Dropouts 45,306 14,880 60,186
(9.63) (11.37) (10.01)
Total 470,298 130,898 601,196
Year 2008/2009 Completers 471,860 142,421 614,281
(90.95) (89.16) (90.53)
Dropouts 46,941 17,321 64,262
(9.05) (10.84) (9.47)
Total 518,801 159,742 678,543
a) Column percentage in brackets.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Descriptive statistics for dropout by cohort comparison groups
Proportion of Dropouts
Treated Controls Difference N
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mergers in 2004
2004 cohort 0.112 0.092 0.020 354,286
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003)




Mergers in 2004, lagged effect on 2005 cohort
2005 cohort 0.097 0.088 0.009 401,620
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003)




Mergers in 2004, lagged effect on 2006 cohort
2006 cohort 0.124 0.111 0.013 445,289
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003)





2005 cohort 0.094 0.088 0.006 398,724
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004)




Mergers in 2005, lagged effect on 2006 cohort
2006 cohort 0.084 0.111 -0.026 441,554
(0.003) (0.000) (0.004)





Treated Controls Difference N
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Mergers in 2005, lagged effect on 2007 cohort
2006 cohort 0.125 0.106 0.019 452,536
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004)





2006 cohort 0.167 0.111 0.056 444,406
(0.004) (0.000) (0.003)




Mergers in 2006, lagged effect on 2007 cohort
2007 cohort 0.180 0.106 0.075 455,240
(0.004) (0.000) (0.003)





2007 cohort 0.103 0.106 -0.002 472131
(0.002) (0.000) ( 0.002)





Table 6: The ATE of college merger on the dropout rate of students. Propen-
sity score matching estimation.
ATT (s.e.) Observations
Controls Treated
PANEL A. In Year Effect
2002/03
Unmatched 0.022*** ( 0.003 ) 424,753 7,840
Matched 0.012*** ( 0.005 ) 424,753 7,840
2003/04
Unmatched 0.006*** ( 0.003 ) 467,094 9,971
Matched 0.012*** ( 0.004 ) 467,094 9,971
2004/05
Unmatched 0.012*** ( 0.003 ) 478,173 10,477
Matched 0.005 ( 0.004 ) 478,173 10,477
2005/06
Unmatched 0.004 ( 0.003 ) 544,811 6,329
Matched -0.008 ( 0.005 ) 544,811 6,328
2006/07
Unmatched 0.049*** ( 0.003 ) 605,275 10,896
Matched 0.045*** ( 0.005 ) 605,275 10,896
2007/08
Unmatched -0.007*** ( 0.002 ) 605,710 29,440
Matched -0.011*** ( 0.002 ) 605,710 29,440
2008/09
Unmatched 0.018*** ( 0.002 ) 657,898 20,645
Matched 0.009*** ( 0.003 ) 657,898 20,645
PANEL B. Short-term Effects,
Lagged 1-3 Years
2003/04, treatment in 2002-03
Unmatched 0.009*** ( 0.003 ) 468,782 8,283
Matched -0.003 ( 0.004 ) 468,782 8,283
2004/05, treatment in 2002-03
Unmatched 0.009*** ( 0.003 ) 480,263 8,387
Matched 0.004 ( 0.004 ) 480,263 8,387
2005/06, treatment in 2002-03
Unmatched 0.009*** ( 0.003 ) 542,074 9,066
22
Controls Treated
Matched 0.004 ( 0.004 ) 542,074 9,066
2004/05, treatment in 2003-04
Unmatched 0.017*** ( 0.003 ) 477,159 11,491
Matched -0.001 ( 0.004 ) 477,159 11,491
2005/06, treatment in 2003-04
Unmatched 0.012*** ( 0.003 ) 538,965 12,175
Matched 0.010*** ( 0.004 ) 538,965 12,175
2006/07, treatment in 2003-04
Unmatched 0.015*** ( 0.003 ) 603,159 13,012
Matched 0.013*** ( 0.004 ) 603,159 13,012
2005/06, treatment in 2004-05
Unmatched 0.005* ( 0.003 ) 541,367 9,773
Matched -0.006 ( 0.004 ) 541,367 9,773
2006/07, treatment in 2004-05
Unmatched 0.011*** ( 0.003 ) 604,183 11,988
Matched 0.006 ( 0.004 ) 604,183 11,988
2007/08, treatment in 2004-05
Unmatched 0.001 ( 0.003 ) 623,388 11,762
Matched -0.004 ( 0.004 ) 623,388 11,762
2006/07, treatment in 2005-06
Unmatched -0.031*** ( 0.003 ) 608,372 7,799
Matched -0.033*** ( 0.005 ) 608,372 7,799
2007/08, treatment in 2005-06
Unmatched 0.016*** ( 0.003 ) 627,670 7,480
Matched 0.011*** ( 0.005 ) 627,670 7,480
2008/09, treatment in 2005-06
Unmatched 0.031*** ( 0.003 ) 661,751 8,416
Matched 0.031*** ( 0.005 ) 661,751 8,416
2007/08, treatment in 2006-07
Unmatched 0.062*** ( 0.003 ) 624,939 10,211
Matched 0.056*** ( 0.005 ) 624,939 10,211
2008/09, treatment in 2006-07
Unmatched 0.059*** ( 0.003 ) 658,235 11,932
Matched 0.059*** ( 0.004 ) 658,235 11,932
2008/09, treatment in 2007-08
Unmatched 0.001 ( 0.002 ) 637,929 32,238
Matched -0.008*** ( 0.002 ) 637,929 32,238
23
Controls Treated
PANEL C. Medium-term Effects
(Mergers from 1998-99)
2002/03, treatment between 1998-99
and 2002-03
Unmatched 0.019*** ( 0.001 ) 388,725 43,868
Matched 0.010*** ( 0.002 ) 388,725 43,868
2003/04, treatment between 1998-99
and 2003-04
Unmatched 0.014*** ( 0.001 ) 415,924 61,141
Matched 0.010*** ( 0.002 ) 415,924 61,141
2004/05, treatment between 1998-99
and 2004-05
Unmatched 0.020*** ( 0.001 ) 411,078 77,572
Matched 0.014*** ( 0.002 ) 411,078 77,572
2005/06, treatment between 1998-99
and 2005-06
Unmatched 0.017*** ( 0.001 ) 462,853 88,287
Matched 0.011*** ( 0.001 ) 462,853 88,287
2006/07, treatment between 1998-99
and 2006-07
Unmatched 0.020*** ( 0.001 ) 509,445 106,726
Matched 0.011*** ( 0.001 ) 509,445 106,726
2007/08, treatment between 1998-99
and 2007-08
Unmatched 0.018*** ( 0.001 ) 496,462 138,688
Matched 0.011*** ( 0.001 ) 496,462 138,688
2008/09, treatment between 1998-99
and 2008-09
Unmatched 0.018*** ( 0.001 ) 518,801 159,742
Matched 0.009*** ( 0.001 ) 518,801 159,742
* p < 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01
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Table 7: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of college merger on
the risk of student drop out.
Cohort
ATT Treated Controls N
(s.e.)
Mergers in 2004
2004 0.010 9,189 345,095 354,286
(0.005)




Mergers in 2004, lagged effect on 2005 cohort
2005 -0.008 8,529 393,091 401,620
(0.005)




Mergers in 2004, lagged effect on 2006 cohort
2006 0.008 10,755 434,534 445,289
(0.004)





2005 -0.006 5,633 393,091 398,724
(0.006)





Cohort ATT Treated Controls N
(s.e.)
Mergers in 2005, lagged effect on 2006 cohort
2006 -0.029 7,020 434,534 441,554
(0.005)




Mergers in 2005, lagged effect on 2007 cohort
2006 0.019 6,735 445,801 452,536
(0.005)





2006 0.050 9,872 434,534 444,406
(0.005)




Mergers in 2006, lagged effect on 2007 cohort
2007 0.066 9,439 445,801 455,240
(0.005)





2007 -0.007 26,330 445,801 472,131
(0.003)





Table 8: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of college merger on
the risk of student drop out, post-Foster Report.
Observations
Cohort ATT Treated Controls N
(s.e.)
Mergers in 2005-2007
2005-2007 0.007 41,835 1,273,426 1,315,261
(0.002)





Table 9: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of college merger on
the risk of student drop out by programme area.
Programme Area Mergers in 2004 Mergers in 2005
2004 2002 DiD 2005 2002 DiD
Science
ATT 0.008 0.028 -0.020 -0.027 0.013 -0.040
(0.012) (0.012) (0.000) (0.014) (0.013) (0.000)
Treated 1,462 1,381 748 1,056
Controls 68,426 65,703 44,000 65,703
N 69,888 67,084 44,749 66,759
Technical Areas4
ATT -0.022 0.073 -0.096 -0.008 -0.009 0.001
(0.017) (0.025) (0.000) (0.022) (0.021) (0.000)
Treated 858 504 608 564
Controls 20,326 14,272 17,648 14,292
N 21,184 14,776 18,258 14,856
Arts & Humanities
ATT 0.030 0.031 -0.001 -0.003 0.010 -0.013
(0.009) (0.007) (0.000) (0.011) (0.008) (0.000)
Treated 2,457 4,399 1,114 2,637
Controls 124,863 171,955 107,759 171,955
N 127,320 176,354 108,873 174,592
Business
ATT -0.047 0.055 -0.102 0.062 0.004 0.058
(0.029) (0.030) (0.000) (0.047) (0.033) (0.000)
Treated 232 347 129 229
Controls 11,595 13,230 7,459 13,230
N 11,830 13,577 7,588 13,459
Services to People
ATT -0.016 0.004 -0.021 -0.048 -0.048 -0.000
(0.010) (0.015) (0.000) (0.012) (0.015) (0.000)
Treated 2,117 1,174 1,178 787
Controls 47,224 34,115 39,129 34,115
N 49,342 35,289 40,308 34,902
Basic Skills
ATT 0.021 0.035 -0.014 -0.001 -0.029 0.028
(0.013) (0.042) (0.000) (0.014) (0.064) (0.000)
Treated 1,279 57 1,107 34
Controls 47,465 5,284 42,534 5,284
N 48,747 5,341 43,643 5,318
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Figure 1: Covariates Balance, year 2005-06. Nearest Neighbour, no replace-
ment.
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Table A.1: Estimated marginal effects from the PSM models, within year
effects.
Year 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
(s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.)
age over 20 -0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 0.009*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
male 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
disable -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.007*** 0.003*** -0.009*** -0.001 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Ethnic origin
Bangladeshi 0.000 -0.013*** -0.004*** -0.007*** 0.017*** -0.031*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Black African -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.031*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Black Caribbean 0.014*** -0.016*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 0.024*** -0.033*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Black other or mixed 0.006*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.002** 0.008*** -0.021*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Chinese 0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.002* -0.001 0.004 -0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Indian 0.011*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 0.012*** -0.032*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pakistani 0.000 -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 0.024*** -0.023*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Asian other or mixed -0.003** -0.007*** -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other or mixed -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.025*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prior attainment
No qualification -0.009*** -0.018*** 0.121*** -0.004*** 0.015*** 0.008*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Below level 1 0.028*** -0.017*** 0.010*** 0.003* 0.006** -0.034*** -0.011***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Level 1 or entry level 0.020*** 0.004*** 0.018*** 0.002** 0.000 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Level 2 -0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** -0.006*** 0.004*** -0.006*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Level 4 or 5 0.045*** 0.002 0.003 0.023*** 0.003 -0.018*** 0.007
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Unknown 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.024*** -0.005*** 0.026*** -0.002* 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of colleges in the llsc 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.003*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R-squared 0.045 0.025 0.135 0.030 0.060 0.018 0.069
N. 432593 477065 488650 551140 616171 635150 670167
* p¡0.1, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
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Table A.2: The min-max method for testing the common support condition,
2002-08.
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
min max min max min max min max
Non merged 0.0033783 0.8354738 0.0049756 0.6218035 0.0060844 0.3736412 0.0167084 0.4304976
Merged 0.0146241 0.7997692 0.0115125 0.6356282 0.0084206 0.3810249 0.022171 0.442333
maxmin minmax maxmin minmax maxmin minmax maxmin minmax
Common support 0.0146241 0.7997692 0.0115125 0.6218035 0.0084206 0.3736412 0.022171 0.4304976
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
min max min max min max
Non merged 0.0224713 0.5269299 0.054417 0.516198 0.0002009 0.2380663
Merged 0.031071 0.5159264 0.0712348 0.516198 0.0019753 0.1177682
maxmin minmax maxmin minmax maxmin minmax
Common support 0.031071 0.5159264 0.0712348 0.516198 0.0019753 0.1177682
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